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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the impact of the 19th century ‘global transformation’ on 
uneven and combined development (UCD). It argues that the intensification of 
UCD by the global transformation led first to a much more uneven and more 
combined world order, and subsequently to a less uneven but increasingly 
combined world order. The consequence of this intense period in the history of 
UCD was a highly centred, core-periphery global order during the 19th century 
and much of the 20th century. However, since the middle part of the 20th 
century, and more obviously since the early part of the 21st century, this is 
giving way to an increasingly decentred global order, still highly combined, but 
with a marked diffusion in the distribution of the modern ‘mode of power’. The 
result is a reduction in the extreme unevenness of power, wealth and status 
that characterized the initial phases of global modernity. 
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 This chapter focuses on the ways in which the 19th century ‘global 
transformation’ impacted on uneven and combined development (UCD).1 The 
first section sets out our general understanding of UCD. The second section 
argues that the intensification of UCD by the global transformation led to a 
highly centred, core-periphery global order during the 19th century and much of 
the 20th century. This was expressed first as a Western-colonial international 
society lasting up to 1945, and subsequently by a Western-global international 
society. The third section sketches briefly how since 1945, and more obviously 
since the early part of the 21st century, world politics is increasingly 
characterized by a decentred international order, still intensely combined, but 
also demonstrating a marked diffusion in the distribution of power, status and 
wealth. The result is a less uneven, but more intensely combined world order.  
 In general terms, this chapter supports two of the main contributions 
made by this book. First, as with the volume as a whole, our account rejects an 
emphasis on, let alone any autonomy of, either ‘inside-out’ or ‘outside-in’ 
explanations. All the sites where modernity took root were particular 
combinations of local and global dynamics – as discussed below, British 
industrialization was fuelled by the de-industrialization of India, while 
imperialism ‘over there’ fed into state-formation ‘at home’. The relational 
sensibility that underpins this chapter – and this book – sees social sites such 
as ‘foreign’ and the ‘domestic’, ‘East’ and ‘West’, and ‘metropole’ and ‘colony’ 
as neither analytically separable, nor empirically discrete (also see Go and 
Lawson 2016). 
Second, like many other contributors to this volume, we enlist uneven 
and combined development in order to generate a non-Eurocentric account of 
macro-historical change. We examine the inter-societal interactions, especially 
trade, technology transfers, imperial extraction, and exchanges of ideas, which 
generated the global transformation. And we stress the ‘entangled histories’ 
and ‘multiple vectors’ that combined to vault Western states into a position of 
pre-eminence during the 19th century (De Vries 2013, 46). Such an account 
stands in contrast to Eurocentric approaches, which see the emergence of 
modernity as conditioned by forces both internal and unique to Europe (Jones, 
1981; Landes 1998; North et al. 2009). In our view, modernity was not self-
generated through the unfolding of particularly European economic practices 
(such as double entry bookkeeping), institutions (such as representative 
governance) or symbolic schemas (such as the Enlightenment). Rather, 
modernity was forged through the co-constitution of local and transnational, 
and its core vectors were inter-societal, from capitalist expansion to 
imperialism. From the 16th to the 19th centuries, a relatively thin international 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, ‘global transformation’ is used synonymously with ‘global modernity’. For a 
full discussion of these terms, see Buzan and Lawson (2015, 1-10). 
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system sustained forms of interaction that were crucial to the development of 
global modernity (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015). From the 19th century 
onwards, global interactions became more unbalanced as a major mode of 
power gap opened up between the European (and later American and 
Japanese) ‘leading-edge’ and most other polities.2 These dynamics allowed a 
small number of mostly Western states to project their power around the world. 
But this power projection did not produce a world of homogeneous social 
orders. Rather, as we explore below, it led to diverse amalgams of old and 
new, and indigenous and foreign (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015, 48-53). Core 
and periphery were intensely locked together even as their entwining fuelled a 
stark unevenness in terms of power differentials and in terms of how social 
orders were constituted. Modernity was a global process both in origins and 
outcomes.  
In one important way, however, we depart from most other contributions 
to this book: our use of UCD is analytical-heuristic rather than causal-
explanatory. Using UCD as a framing device allows us to construct a relatively 
straightforward account of macro-historical periodization: during the early 
phases of the global transformation, development became both much more 
uneven and much more combined; in recent years, there has been a (partial) 
reduction of the former and a (powerful) intensification of the latter. We are not 
concerned with deploying specific causal dynamics associated with UCD 
theory. Rather, we see global modernity as generated by the interplay between 
three macro-dynamics: industrialization (and associated processes of de-
industrialization); rational statehood (and imperialism); and ideologies of 
progress (liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and ‘scientific’ racism). It is the 
configuration generated by the intersection of these three macro-dynamics that 
produced the global transformation, not any specific causal wager associated 
with UCD. For our purposes, UCD is most usefully seen as an analytical 
shorthand rather than as a theoretical schema containing a set of auxiliary 
causal claims.  
 
Uneven and Combined Development 
 
 Like Justin Rosenberg (2010, 2013), we understand ‘unevenness’ to be a 
basic fact of historical development, even if degrees of unevenness vary 
considerably across international orders. There are three drivers that lie behind 
the universality of uneven development: first, the diversity of geographical 
endowments; second, the physical separation of political units; and third, the 
differential impact of ‘combination’, whether this takes the form of the spread of 
ideas, the transfer of technologies, trading networks, security alliances, or 
practices of subjugation and emulation. ‘Combination’, by which we mean the 
                                                 
2 By ‘leading-edge’, we mean those polities in which the configuration of the modern ‘mode 
of power’ first assembled. We discuss the concept of the ‘mode of power’ below. 
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ways in which social orders trade, coerce, emulate, borrow and steal from 
each other, is also intrinsic to any international order and, like unevenness, 
can vary greatly in degree. Before the 19th century, degrees of combination 
varied mainly with geography, which facilitated deep connections in some 
environments (most notably where there were available sea and river routes), 
but obstructed it in others (particularly in the case of land barriers). Available 
technologies, most notably the quality of ships and knowledge of navigation, 
and up to a point the construction of roads, also made a major difference to 
degrees of combination. By contrast, degrees of combination since the 19th 
century have been heavily determined by industrial technologies. Under the 
impact of steamships, railways, highways, aircraft, spacecraft and electronic 
means of communication from the telegraph to the internet, the importance of 
geography falls away, and combination intensifies rapidly, and probably 
permanently. Combination therefore increases directly with the third element of 
UCD: ‘development’. Combination is both a homogenizing force, as seen in 
pressures to conform with, or measure up to, standards of ‘modernization’, 
‘Westernization’ or ‘civilization’, but also one that promotes differentiation, as in 
the multiple responses around the world to these pressures.   
 In this perspective, UCD stands as an alternative to Waltz’s (1979, 76) 
formulation of homogenization into like units through ‘socialization and 
competition’. Both Waltz and Rosenberg see socialization and competition as 
consequences of combination. But they disagree about their effects, with Waltz 
favouring homogenization into ‘like units’, and Rosenberg stressing that the 
particular timing and circumstances of socialization and competition produce 
variable outcomes. The extreme conditions created by macro-historical 
transformations such as the one that took place during the long 19th century 
expose the logic of the latter with great clarity. Major transformations of this 
kind have a distinct point or points of origin in which a particular configuration 
emerges and is sustained. This configuration is produced and reproduced 
through inter-societal interactions. Morris (2010, ch.2), for example, charts how 
in an earlier macro-transformation, settled agrarian communities spread from 
the hilly flanks of Mesopotamia northwest into Europe, and from other 
originating cores, as in China, to wider zones. Further changes spread 
outwards from this leading-edge (or edges). The pace of spread varied 
according to the mediating effects of social and physical environments. 
Agriculture was slow to spread to less productive soils and climates, and some 
modes of social order were more receptive to it than others. If unevenness was 
– and is – a basic fact of historical development, different peoples and places 
encounter macro-transformative pressures at different times and under 
different circumstances (Rosenberg 2010, 2013).  
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The spread of a new ‘mode of power’ thus produces diverse outcomes.3 
Each social order that encounters the new configuration has its own way of 
adapting to it. The ‘whip of external necessity’ (Trotsky 1997[1932], 27) 
produced by a new mode of power is often coercive, occurring through force of 
arms. But inter-societal dynamics also take the form of imitation. Some social 
orders do not take on the new configuration at all, either because of internal 
resistance to the changes it requires, or because of attempts by leading-edge 
polities to maintain inequalities between them by denying access to elements 
of the transformation. Others succeed in developing indigenous versions of the 
new configuration. ‘Late’ developers are not carbon copies of the original 
adopters, but develop their own distinctive characteristics. In this sense, the 
interactions between different social orders produce not convergence, but 
(often unstable) amalgams of new and old. For example, during the 19th 
century, German industrialization was not a replica of British development, but 
took distinct form, even as it borrowed from the British experience. Likewise 
Soviet and, more recently, Chinese development also maintained their own 
‘characteristics’, combining new technologies and productive forces alongside 
inherited social formations. Through the analytic of UCD, it becomes clear that 
development is multilinear rather than linear, proceeds in fits and starts rather 
than through smooth gradations, and contains many variations in terms of 
outcomes. One indicator of the ways in which polities adapted in diverse ways 
to the 19th century global transformation is the variety of ideologies that have 
emerged to define different assemblages of economy, politics and culture in 
the modern world: liberalism, social democracy, conservatism, socialism, 
communism, fascism, patrimonialism, and more. These ‘contradictory fusions’ 
aver that historical development is jumbled, and often compressed (Rosenberg 
2010).  
Because global transformations are generated through multiple 
revolutions from new political formations to the advent of new technologies, 
they amplify the link between development and combination. Such 
transformations typically generate increases in productivity and population, 
plus increases in the complexity of social orders and physical technologies, 
consequently producing a denser, more deeply connected international order. 
The expanded scale, complexity and technological capacities of agrarian 
polities meant that they had more intense relationships with both their 
neighbours and peoples further away than their hunter-gatherer predecessors. 
                                                 
3 By ‘mode of power’, we mean the material and ideational relations that are generative of 
both actors and the ways in which power is exercised. As we note above, during the global 
transformation, three dynamics (industrialization, rational statehood and ‘ideologies of 
progress’) combined to generate a new basis for how power was constituted, organized and 
expressed – we refer to this as a shift in the ‘mode of power’. Contra most IR approaches, 
changes in the mode of power are more significant than changes in the distribution of 




Those relationships were military, political, economic and cultural, or some 
mixture of these. In this way, the scale and intensity of combination within the 
international sphere increased, meaning that every society became less self-
contained and more exposed to developments elsewhere. As social orders 
became larger in scale and more complex in terms of their internal 
organization, differences between them were accentuated and interactions 
between them intensified. Late developers cannot escape the influence of 
earlier adopters, but neither do they reproduce them. The mutual constitution 
of unevenness and combination is thus intensified by development, producing 
larger, more complex and more diverse social orders bound together in 




During the 19th century, a ‘global transformation’ intensified the meaning of 
development, and therefore the logic of UCD, to an unprecedented degree, 
resulting in the formation of a highly centred core-periphery international order. 
As discussed above, we see the global transformation as constituted by a 
concatenation of three interlinked processes: industrialization, the rational 
state, and ideologies of progress. Once this concatenation had formed, it 
constituted a new mode of power with massive transformative potential. Some 
of the roots of this mode of power went back centuries. But it was only in the 
19th century that the whole package coalesced in a small group of polities from 
where both its effect (a revolutionary configuration in the mode of power) and 
its challenge (how other societies responded to this configuration) became the 
principal dynamic through which international relations was conceived and 
practiced. In this context, development not only took on a new form and 
meaning, but also became highly dynamic, driven by seemingly endless cycles 
of technological innovation.  
Because the global transformation initially took root only within a 
relatively small number of polities,4 and because its new, complex, and highly 
dynamic mode of power was extremely difficult to copy, global unevenness 
was intensified to an unprecedented extent. During the 19th century, the 
development gap between societies opened more widely than ever before. 
Global modernity encountered peoples living in a variety of political, economic 
and cultural formations, from hunter-gatherer bands to city-states and empires. 
                                                 
4 As already suggested above, this is not to say that the sources of the global transformation 
were endogenous to these polities. To the contrary, global modernity was forged from inter-
societal, often coercive, interactions between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. To take one illustration, 
Indian textiles were either banned from Britain or levied with high tariffs, while British 
manufacturing products were forcibly imported into India without duty. Between 1814 and 
1828, British cloth exports to India rose from 800,000 yards to over 40 million yards, while 
during the same period, Indian cloth exports to Britain halved (Goody 1996, 131). 
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In size, these social orders varied from groups of a few dozen to empires 
consisting of tens of millions of people. This variety meant that the power gap 
between core and periphery, and the challenge posed by the global 
transformation to those in the periphery, prompted quite different experiences 
of modernity. A relatively even distribution of global power amongst several, 
mostly lightly connected, agrarian empires was replaced by a radically uneven 
global distribution of power in favour of a handful of mostly Western polities. 
Some peoples and polities were able to resist or adapt to the global 
transformation’s multiple assault; others were consumed by it. At one end of 
the spectrum were the many indigenous peoples in settler colonies who were 
all but obliterated; at the other were those like the Japanese who adapted the 
modern mode of power to indigenous social formations. 
The Japanese case is particularly interesting because for a century it 
was the only major example of a non-Western people acquiring the revolutions 
of modernity quickly, and using them to overcome the power gap established 
by the global transformation. With the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, Japan 
formally joined the ranks of the great powers, and its development went on to 
outpace many European laggards. In effect, Japan was the first mover in what 
we now think of as the ‘rise of the rest’ that began in earnest during the 1970s. 
Why Japan was able to do this so early is as difficult a question as why 
modernity first took root in northwest Europe. Allinson and Anievas (2010, 479-
85) offer useful explanations in terms of a conjuncture of: an unusual 
Japanese class structure (especially the fluid position of the samurai); 
fortuitous timing (having a first encounter with the West in the 1850s rather 
than the 1880s); being less attractive than China and India in terms of 
extractable resources; and being able to turn the multiple challenges of global 
modernity into the stimulation of a developmental state rather than a retreat 
into feudalism. Japan also had some other notable advantages. Unlike China, 
it was able to provide a cultural bridge between ‘modern’ and ‘archaic’ by 
retaining its emperor and its Shinto religion. When the Qing dynasty collapsed 
in 1911, China’s political continuity was broken and the country fragmented 
into decades of warlordism and civil war. And again unlike China, Japan was 
able to appropriate nationalism as a unifying idea to help it through the 
turbulence of modernization. Because the Qing were Manchu, they could not 
use nationalism without threatening their ruling position in relation to the Han 
majority. Japan, of course, also had the advantage of warning time. A decade 
before it was forced to respond to Commodore Perry’s black ships, it could 
observe closely what was happening to China during the Opium Wars.  
The extremely rapid emergence of a modernizing core, including both 
Western powers and Japan, during the 19th century meant that never before 
had unevenness been felt on this scale, with this intensity, or in a context of 
such close, inescapable interdependence. Those convinced of their cultural 
superiority and with access to advanced weapons, industrial production, 
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medicine, and new forms of bureaucratic organization gained a pronounced 
advantage over those with limited access to these sources of power. After 
around 1800, these dynamics fostered a substantial power gap between a 
small number of Western polities and other societies around the world (Buzan 
and Lawson 2015, ch. 1). In principle, this power gap could be closed: those 
with access to the configuration that sustained the global transformation could 
move from periphery to core. In practice, this move was made exceptionally 
difficult not only by the depth of the transformative package, but also by 
practices of imperialism and other forms of interventionism that reinforced the 
advantages of the established core. Japan was the exception that proved the 
rule. The result was a shift from a ‘polycentric world with no dominant centre’ to 
a core-periphery international order in which the leading edge was located in 
the West (Pomeranz 2000, 4). This hierarchical international order lasted from 
the early 19th century until the early years of the 21st century.  
 The first phase of this centred global order took the form of a Western-
colonial international society, and this form remained dominant until 1945. 
Western-colonial international society was global in scale, but extremely 
unequal. Its core comprised most European states, their now independent 
former settler colonies in North America, and from the late 19th century, Japan. 
Its periphery was a mixture of colonies, largely absorbed into the sovereignty of 
their metropoles (most of Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia), the 
decolonised polities of Latin America, and a handful of classical agrarian 
powers still strong enough to avoid colonization, but weak enough to be 
treated as unequal (China, Iran, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire). Although there 
was a trickle of erosions of inequality between core and periphery before 1945, 
Western-colonial international society broadly endured until the end of the 
Second World War. 
Western-colonial international society was the starkest possible 
expression of the uneven and combined character of global modernity. 
Because imperialism was the outward expression of the new mode of power, it 
exemplified the unevenness between the haves and have-nots of the global 
transformation. At the same time, imperialism was one of the principal means 
through which polities and peoples were combined on a global scale. During 
the long 19th century, European powers sought to exert control, both directly 
and indirectly, over most of the globe. If the bulk of European imperialism took 
place during the ‘Scramble for Africa’, which saw European powers assume 
direct control of large parts of Africa, the extension of imperialism went well 
beyond the ‘Scramble’. Between 1810 and 1870, the US carried out 71 
territorial annexations and military interventions (Go 2011, 39). The US first 
became a continental empire, seizing territory from Native Americans, the 
Spanish and the Mexicans. It then built an overseas empire, extending its 
authority over Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa and the Virgin Islands. Other settler 
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states also became colonial powers in their own right, including Australia and 
New Zealand in the Pacific. Japan, the only non-Western state to fully 
incorporate the revolutions of modernity during the 19th century, constructed an 
empire in East Asia. Russian expansionism accelerated during this period, 
both southwards to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and eastwards 
to Sakhalin and Vladivostok. Imperialism, therefore, was a central vector within 
the uneven and combined character of global modernity and an equally central 
tool of the core-periphery international order that arose from it. Politically, 
militarily, economically and demographically, a relatively small group of mostly 
Western polities created a colonial international order that privileged their 
treasuries, their strategic interests, and their people. They subordinated the 
rest of the world while, at the same time, coercively extending to planetary 
scale the configuration that underpinned global modernity.  
 A central feature of Western-colonial order was the uneven extension of 
industrialisation, production and finance, which generated a core-periphery 
order in which the ebbs and flows of metropolitan markets, commodity 
speculations and price fluctuations controlled the survival chances of millions 
of people around the world. The global transformation produced a single, 
highly combined, world economy for the first time. This global economy was 
enabled by improved technologies of transportation and communication, 
technologies that also made war and politics global, producing an integrated, 
yet hierarchical, global order. Accelerating market integration amplified both 
unevenness and combination (Bayly 2004, 2). On the one hand, commodities 
increasingly flowed from the periphery into the core: by 1900, Britain was 
importing 60% of its total calories and the average distance travelled by the 
fruit, vegetables and animals it imported was 1,800 miles (Schwartz 2000, 
105). At the outbreak of the First World War, Britain imported 87% of its food 
and a similar proportion of its raw materials (Ruggie 1982, 401, fn. 69). On the 
other hand, capital and manufactured goods flowed from the core into the 
periphery. These two-directional flows, however unequally constituted, could 
increase both trade and growth. West African trade, for example, centred on 
palm oil, groundnuts, timber and cocoa, increased by a factor of 4 between 
1897-1913 (Frieden 2006, 74). In Latin America, economies grew at four times 
the rate of Asian polities and at six times the rate of Central and Eastern 
European states between 1870-1913 (Frieden 2006, 73). In some sectors, 
peripheral states led the world: by 1900, Brazil produced 80% of the world’s 
coffee exports; by 1913, Chile provided half of the world’s copper and Malaya 
produced half of the world’s tin (Frieden 2006, 73-5).  
 During the initial phase of the global transformation, therefore, the 
development gap between polities opened more widely than ever before and, 
at the same time (and for the same reasons), the planet was bound together 
more tightly than in previous eras. This dynamic vaulted a few Western states 
into a period of unprecedented, if temporary, dominance over other parts of the 
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world (Hobsbawm 1962, 15, 44). On the basis of the new mode of power, the 
West became hegemonic over many aspects of international relations, 
projecting new forms of organization and new ideas that destabilized existing 
social orders, both at home and abroad. During the 19th century, the West 
broke open and overwhelmed the remaining bastions of the classical world 
(the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan), and overcame the environmental 
barriers both of disease (that had restricted Europeans to coastal enclaves in 
Africa) and distance (through the advent of railways, steamships and the 
telegraph). As Hobsbawm (1962, 365) notes, ‘nothing, it seemed, could stand 
in the way of a few western gunboats or regiments bringing with them trade 
and bibles’. This configuration enabled new organizational forms to emerge 
such as the nation-state, the modern firm, intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) and, more broadly, proto-global civil society in the guise of 
transnational social movements ranging from anti-slavery campaigners to 
advocates of free trade. For better or worse, and often both together, the long 
19th century saw the transformation of the daily condition of people nearly 
everywhere on the planet. The 19th century was, therefore, the beginning of 
what we might call ‘the Western era’, setting loose revolutions in terms of both 
material capabilities and symbolic schemas. 
 Rosenberg (2013) argues that the Great War of 1914-18 was the 
culmination of the uneven and combined development of global modernity, and 
the industrialization of violence that had been unfolding for more than eight 
decades. There is some truth in this claim. But the highly unequal Western-
colonial order nonetheless endured throughout the interwar period, after which 
it gave way to Western-global international society. By adopting the term 
Western-global, we take a position on how to understand contemporary 
international society and how to deal with the legacy of its colonial origins. The 
idea that there is a global international society rests on the view that it 
emerged from the expansion of Western international society to planetary 
scale, with decolonization producing states that were homogenous, if only in 
the sense of being sovereign equals. The price of independence, or for those 
not colonized the price of being accepted as equals by the West, was the 
adoption of Western political forms and the acceptance of the primary 
institutions of Western international society: the market, the legalized 
hegemony of great power management, positive international law, and 
suchlike. ‘Modernization theory’ held out the prospect of the ‘Third World’ 
becoming more like the ‘First World’ (Rostow 1960), while polities around the 
world were categorized as ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, or ‘advanced’ and 
‘emerging’. In each of these classifications, the Western mode of economic, 
political and cultural organization was taken to be both natural and pre-
eminent. In significant respects, therefore, the post-1945 era saw the 
maintenance of a hegemonic, core-periphery structure in which a Western core 
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was surrounded by regional international societies that existed in varying 
degrees of differentiation from, and subordination to, that core. 
This second phase of centred globalism was defined by the 
delegitimation of racism and colonialism, the abandonment of divided 
sovereignty in favour of sovereign equality, and the dismantling of empires. Yet 
many features of Western-colonial order remained, from the discourse and 
politics of development, aid, intervention and migration, to structural 
inequalities in the world economy. During this period, the mode of power that 
underpinned the global transformation remained predominantly sited in a small 
number of mostly Western states plus Japan, and later South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Singapore, thus perpetuating a core-periphery order, albeit with a reduced 
degree of formal imperialism. The end of the Cold War even strengthened the 
position of the Western core by valorising economic strands of liberalism 
(reconstituted as ‘neo-liberalism’) as the prototypical feature of modernity 
(Lawson 2010). 
 Such dynamics, along with rapid technological changes, helped to foster 
increasing levels of combination. Yet while the shift from Western-colonial to 
Western-global international society still reflected a centred global order, this 
period also saw the beginning of a decline in levels of unevenness. The shift 
from divided sovereignty to formal sovereign equality reduced differences in 
political and legal (and racial) status, and this shift was reinforced by a 
proliferation of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In some ways these 
IGOs perpetuated the core-periphery inequality of status by legitimising what 
Simpson (2004) calls the ‘legalised hegemony’ of the great powers. But, in 
general, they supported sovereign equality, and the great power principle saw 
a non-Western state (China) take up a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. Several other states, most notably the Asian Tigers, 
developed rapidly. So too, from the 1980s onwards, did China, thereby greatly 
expanding the core of the modern global economy. The military gap narrowed 
in a number of ways, particularly with the widespread diffusion of light infantry 
weapons (making territorial occupations extremely expensive), and the much 
narrower diffusion of nuclear weapons to some developing countries (Buzan 
and Lawson 2015, ch. 8).  
These first two phases of the global transformation brought to an end the 
long period in which human history was mainly local and contact between 
distant polities mostly fairly light. From the 19th century on, human history 
became increasingly global, contact among far-flung peoples intense, and 
development both more uneven and more combined. Driving these changes 
was the global transformation from predominantly agrarian to primarily 
industrial societies, and from absolutist orders to rational states, along with the 






 The revolutions of modernity are still spreading and intensifying – 
‘globalization’ refers to their outward expansion (Giddens 1990, 45-54). As 
modernity continues to spread and intensify, Western dominance is being 
increasingly challenged. In the early 21st century, we are living in the beginning 
of the end of this highly unequal phase of the revolutions of modernity: centred 
globalism is giving way to decentred globalism. Decentred refers to the ways in 
which the configuration that marks the global transformation is no longer 
concentrated in a small group of polities, but is increasingly dispersed. 
Globalism marks both a basic continuity and an intensification of earlier 
phases of the global transformation in which the configuration of modernity 
assumed planetary scale. In the contemporary world, power and development 
are increasingly less unevenly concentrated and more combined than in 
previous periods of global modernity. Those polities that were once on the 
receiving end of the global transformation are employing its mode of power to 
reassert their position in international society. 
 Slowly and unevenly, but at an accelerating pace, the massive inequality 
across the planet that was established during the 19th century is being eroded. 
The mechanism behind this closing of the power gap is the same one that 
created it in the first place: the revolutions of modernity. Politically, legally and 
demographically, the gap has narrowed significantly; economically and 
militarily it has narrowed less, but still appreciably (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 
ch. 7). This is both changing the composition of the core (making it larger, 
more diverse and less white/Western) and changing its relationship to the 
periphery (as the core and semi-periphery get bigger, and the periphery 
smaller). The revolutions of modernity began by producing an unprecedented 
degree of inequality in a context of highly uneven and combined development. 
Development remains highly combined and that is likely to increase rather than 
decrease. It is still uneven, but in many key respects that unevenness is 
diminishing. Some parts of the former periphery have either caught up with and 
joined the old core, or are on their way to doing so. However, as noted above, 
combination is both a homogenizing and differentiating force. So while the 
diffusion of modernity reduces unevenness in some respects (most obviously 
power, status and wealth), it sustains it in others. For example, while there has 
been a narrowing of ideological bandwidth compared to the 20th century – 
virtually all states around the world are now organized around capitalist logics 
– this homogenization comes with what looks like a quite stable diversity of 
political forms, from ‘liberal democratic’ (e.g. US, UK), through ‘social 
democratic’ (e.g. Germany, Japan) and ‘competitive authoritarian’ (e.g. Russia, 
Malaysia) to ‘state bureaucratic’ (e.g. China, Saudi Arabia) (Buzan and Lawson 
2014a). The diffusion of modernity is only homogenizing up to a point. 
Thereafter, it is diversified by distinct cultural and political formations. 
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 The economic crisis that began in 2008 may well come to be seen as the 
tipping point at which the extreme unevenness and centredness of the period 
of Western domination began decisively to give way to a less uneven, more 
decentred global order (Buzan and Lawson 2014b). The distribution of power, 
status and wealth in the contemporary world is becoming less uneven and 
more diffuse among states (though not necessarily or even probably within 
them). In general, this means that the West will lose its privileged position in 
international society. This is already visible in the emergence of new sites of 
global governance (e.g. the G20), economic formations (e.g. the BRICs), and 
security institutions (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). The 
diffusion of power is being accompanied by a diffusion of legitimacy, making it 
difficult for the US to hold onto its sole superpower status. 
 The age of superpowers was a particular consequence of the highly 
uneven distribution of power created by the Western-colonial phase of global 
modernity and sustained by its Western-global phase. During these two 
periods, polities like Britain and the US amassed sufficient relative power to be 
world dominating. That level of capability is no longer possible. With many 
states becoming wealthy and powerful, no single polity will be able to 
accumulate sufficient relative power to dominate international society. 
Decentred globalism will remain highly combined but will also be increasingly 
less uneven in terms of power, status and wealth. It is both the successor to 
the Western dominated era of the 19th and 20th centuries and, in a way, marks 
the restoration of the classical order in which the distribution of power was 
fairly even. The difference between the contemporary era and that before the 
19th century is that, whereas much of the world before the 19th century was 
only lightly combined, the contemporary era is one of intense – and intensifying 




 To sum up, our argument is that the global transformation strengthened 
the impact of UCD in two ways. First, the global transformation opened up a 
very large and difficult to close gap between those in possession of the modern 
mode of power and those without access to it. Second, the global 
transformation hugely increased degrees of combination. The new mode of 
power largely swept away the geographical-environmental determinants of 
unevenness and combination, replaced them with a redefined version of 
development. By producing massive increases in both unevenness and 
combination, the global transformation generated an international order 
characterized by centred globalism. In the early years of the 21st century, a 
more decentred global order is emerging in which unevenness is diminishing 
but levels of combination are intensifying. This is not to say that unevenness 
will disappear – it was both produced by the global transformation and also 
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productive of it in that a much smaller ‘core’ appropriated the vast resources of 
the ‘periphery’. But in the contemporary world, the Western-led order enabled 
by the early unevenness and combination of global modernity is beginning to 
erode. In its place is emerging a more decentred and more globalised order, 
one that comes clearly into view when viewed through the analytic of uneven 
and combined development.  
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